owner and the tiller. On the other hand, the Japanese government has encouraged large scale tenant farming since 1970, and particularly since 1980, but could not achieve this objective due to inconsistent policies to restrain the separation of land owner and the tiller. Given the unsatisfactory results of Japanese agricultural policy which has focused large scale tenancy farming, the introduction of efficient contract farming would be another beneficial policy option for Japanese rice production in the Non-Hokkaido region.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section II shows some statistical evidence that justifies my assertion. Section III reports the results of quantitative analysis. Section IV concludes the paper with some policy implications.
II. Some Statistical Evidence
The Japanese and Taiwanese economies have many characteristics in common. In both economies the farm size distribution is skewed to the left, and part-time farm households are prevalent after the success of industrialization. Other similarities are found in the variety of rice produced, price supports, farmland regulations, and post World War II farmland reforms.
The major objective of land reform laws were to prevent the concentration of farmland towards a small number of absentee landlords as was often the case with the rural villages in Japan in the 1940s. The 1952 Japanese Agricultural Land Law stressed the principle that "farmland should be owned by those who actually cultivate it." The law imposed the upper limit on the ownership of farmland (3 ha in the Non-Hokkaido regions and 12 ha in the Hokkaido region), and kept the rent on a low level to help small scale tenant farmers. The law also determined that in principle landlords could not terminate land lease contract apart from the case where their tenants refused to pay rent for no reason. In Taiwan, the 1949 37.5
Percent Rent Reduction Act, the sale of public land, and the 1953 Land-to-the-tiller Act played the same role as the 1952 Japanese Agricultural Law did. As a result, the land lease contract became uncommon in both Japan and Taiwan, unlike in many other countries in Asia, North America, and Europe, and we found huge number of small scale owner-tiller farms in those two economies.. Both Japanese and Taiwanese land reforms were believed to be the most successful reforms ever taken in anywhere in the Asian countries, although they were guided by the American strategies against possible communist revolution.
Reflecting those farmland regulations, the farm size distribution in Taiwan and the Non-Hokkaido region of Japan is almost identical even in 1985 as can be seen in Table 1 .
However, there are many important differences between these two economies: the price level for rice, the rice production costs, and in particular, the ownership of machinery. Table 2 shows the area of rice harvest per machine in both economies.
The Japanese statistics are for rice producing farms only, but the Taiwanese statistics are for machines held by all farm households, therefore the area of rice harvest per machines in Taiwan could be underestimated. Nonetheless, the average tractor in Taiwan works more than ten times as large an area as does the average tractor in Japan. Table 2 shows that even in the Hokkaido region of Japan, where large scale farming prevails for historical reasons as can be seen in Table 1 , the average tractor in Taiwan works more than twice as large an area.
This observation does not simply reflect the fact that Taiwanese farms use labor intensive techniques. By 1990, 98 percent of rice production was accomplished by machinery in Taiwan. Moreover, as can be seen in Table 3 , in 1990, Taiwanese rice production required farmers to spend 238 hours in 1 ha of paddy field on average, while Japanese farmers in the Non-Hokkaido region spent 456 hours in 1 ha of paddy on average, and throughout the process of economic development, Taiwanese farmers have worked shorter hours than Japanese farmers.
In short, Taiwanese farms utilize a relatively small number of machines more efficiently than Japanese farms in the Non-Hokkaido region, given an almost identical farm size distribution. This fact could be explained by Taiwanese governmental policy.
The Taiwanese government encouraged the mechanization of farms by organizing "custom farming" teams, which were groups of young and able farmers who purchased machinery and worked for those who did not have it.
As a result, small land owners were encouraged to turn over their land to full-time farm households and received non-farm job opportunities. Readers might wonder if the same division of labor could have been achieved through the land lease contract.
However, the Taiwanese government did not abolish the 37.5 Percent Rent
Reduction Act, therefore the production of rice based on tenant farming was not a profitable business. Moreover, the 37. stressed that the contractual farming system was not regarded as a tenancy system.
In 1983, the 37.5 Percent Rent Reduction Act was amended to give entrusted farming and custom farming a stronger legal basis. Those policies were consistent with the idea of maintaining the social values of small family farm while compensating for its economic weakness through governmental and co-operative actions.
As a result, despite the fact that the farmland market did not work well,
Taiwanese farms achieved efficient production of rice by the custom farming without changing the farm size distribution. the increase in non-farm income has helped their desire come true. As a result, the Japanese counterpart to custom farming, "contract farming," is not as common as it is in Taiwan, as can be seen in Table 4 . "Contract farming" in Japan usually means that the larger farms, agricultural cooperative associations, or Agricultural
Production Organizations take care of particular stages of rice production using machinery for the sake of other farms. Note that the Japanese contract farming is based on the bilateral agreement between the parties who want to use their machines efficiently and the farms who find it difficult to conduct some stages of rice production by themselves for some reason. Since such an opportunities are scattered over the rural communities, it is hard to match the demand for contract farming with the supply of contract farming. It is clear in Table 4 that most of the Japanese farms in the Non-Hokkaido regions do not utilize contract farming.
Therefore, given the inactive farmland market, excessive investment to the machines leads to the observation that the machine cost, labor cost, and primary cost (total cost of production of rice minus by product) per 1 ha of paddy decreases with farm size as can be seen in Table 5 .
It has been suggested that the promotion of large-scale farming is one of the most promising ways to achieve efficient rice production in the Non-Hokkaido region of Japan, but there is no way to compete with the large-scale farming in the U.S., where 100 ha rice farms are typical. I argue that although Japanese rice production may never occur at the large scale of U.S. farms, Japanese farms in the Non-Hokkaido region could be at least as efficient as Taiwanese farms via contract farming. This is because the two economies have many things in common, apart from the fact that small Japanese farms invests too much in agricultural machines.
I shall further argue that contract farming, in addition to the large scale tenancy system, is one important way to restore the efficiency of Japanese rice production, and I will show some evidence to support my argument in the next section.
III. Some Quantitative Evidence

A. Basic Results
Many Japanese researchers point out that the introduction of machines, whose speed of operation depends upon the size of paddies, into small and irregularly shaped paddies leads to a decreasing unit costs of rice production as the total area in rice cultivation in the cross section of farms increases, as we have seen in Here, subscript i represents the farm size category of the grouped average data.
For example, 0.3-0.5 ha farms, 0.5-1.0 ha farms, and so forth. Primary cost is the total rice production costs net of the value of by products. Output is measured by kg of brown rice unit. This specification assumes that the factor prices relevant for the rice production are constant within Japan. Therefore, cross sectionally, it is impossible to identify the effect of factor prices on the cost function. This assumption is reasonable given the situation where agricultural cooperatives dictate the sale of agricultural implements and materials used for the rice production.
According to Hayami and Kawagoe, the cost elasticity of scale, a1, was 0.918, 0.919, 0.923, 0.869, 0.820, 0.786 and 0.774 respectively for the periods from 1951-55, 56-60, 61-65, 66-70, 71-75, 76-80 and 81-85 . That is, the cost elasticity of scale fell over time as Japan introduced larger machines. Hayami and Kawagoe argued that this was the result of a land market imperfection, because the efficient techniques used by the large-scale farms did not prevail on all farms.
In the previous section I pointed out that Taiwanese farms are as small as Japanese farms and subject to several regulations, but their mechanization was based on "custom farming" teams. In such a situation, neither small farm size nor farmland regulations can be the source of economies of scale if the argument of Hayami and Kawagoe is right; i.e., a1 should be close to one if we estimate equation ( 1 ) using Taiwanese data.
We will verify this conjecture by estimating equation ( 2 ) where a t shows the time effect in year t using grouped average data on farms with less than 0.5 ha, 0.5-0.75 ha, 0.75-1.0 ha, 1.0-1.5 ha, and more than 1.5 ha of rice cultivation between 1985-1991 as found in Taiwanese rice cost survey statistics. Japanese average data on the farms in the Non-Hokkaido region, where the farm size distribution is almost identical to that of Taiwan, from 1986 Taiwan, from -1991 Overall consideration suggests that the relevant model is the random effects model for the Non-Hokkaido region of Japan, and that a plausible value for a1 is 0.755. The results are consistent with those of Hayami and Kawagoe, and we do not find any significant structural changes in Japanese rice production after 1985.
For Taiwan, cross sectional estimates of equation (2) However, the F-value testing the null hypothesis of constancy of a1 and a t is large enough for us to reject this pooling model at zero percent level of significance.
The model which restricts a1 to be constant over time but allows a t to vary yields an a1 estimate of 1.0002. The F-value testing the restricted model versus the cross sectional model is 2.5678, and I accept the null hypothesis of constancy of a1 over time only at the 4 % level. The random effects model also suggests that a1 is 0.9996, but in the case of Taiwan, the statistically preferred model is the restricted model since the Hausman test statistic for the random effects model is large enough for us to reject the null hypothesis of the random effects model. The finding that the production technology of rice in Taiwan exhibits constant returns to scale is consistent with the results of Kuroda, who estimates a translog cost function using Taiwanese data from the years 1976-1993, and finds that the elasticity of cost with respect to scale is one.
In summary, given almost the same farm size distribution, Japanese rice production in the Non-Hokkaido region is characterized as exhibiting increasing returns to scale but the Taiwanese economy exhibits constant returns to scale.
Since the source of increasing returns to scale in Japan is the inefficient usage of machines as we have seen in Table 5 , it is reasonable to find that Taiwanese rice production, which utilizes the machinery efficiently though custom farming, exhibits constant returns to scale technology.
To check the robustness of my results shown in Table 6 , I show the results of regression equation (2) using total cost, which adds rent and capital interest to primary cost, rather than primary cost as a dependent variable following Hayami and Kawagoe. The results are summarized in Table 7 . Although the estimates of a1 are slightly larger than those shown in Table 6 , the qualitative results are robust to the choice of cost measure.
B. Results based on Agricultural Production Organizations data
Readers might want to see the Japanese rice production costs under contract farming. To this end, recent Japanese statistics from Agricultural Production Organizations, which become available after 1991, are useful. An Agricultural Production Organization can be a joint production organization of farms, or a union of farms which works together on some particular stages of rice production on behalf of member farms. Therefore, the production costs of Japanese Agricultural Production Organizations are a good proxy for the cost of production via contract farming. Using data from Agricultural Production Organizations during the period from 1991-1994, we estimate equation ( 2 ) Note that the results using farm data from 1991-1994 shown in Tables 8 and   9 suggest that the relevant model is the random effects model, and a plausible value for a1 is 0.764 using primary cost and 0.831 using total cost, which are almost the same as the estimate of a1 obtained from the 1985-1991 data.
In summary, we could not find evidence of constant returns to scale using data from Japanese Agricultural Production Organizations. However, the evidence suggests that the introduction of contract farming would help to restore the efficiency of rice production in the sense that it increases the value of a1 in equation ( 2 ). Therefore, I argue that it makes sense to expand contract farming in the Non-Hokkaido regions of Japan.
IV. Policy Implications
The sustained efficiency in the rice production during the process of substituting machines for agricultural labor in Taiwan seems to be relevant for the NonHokkaido region of Japan. Small farm size per se will not be a source of inefficiency as long as the separation of owner and tiller can be achieved through machine sharing or contract farming. The Japanese government should change any legal or institutional treatments that have induced farmers to be owner-tillers as long as it is useful to reduce the rice production costs. The local agricultural committee, the agricultural cooperative associations, and local government can
give the information on the demand and supply of contract farming as well as land market to every farmer. If the entry of joint stock companies in the agricultural production were allowed, those information would be very valuable. Such reform might result in the prevalence of both contract farming and land lease contract.
However, contract farming is more flexible than land lease contract because farmers can choose the particular stages of production which they would like to ask someone to work for them. We may be able to restore the efficiency of production of rice in the Non-Hokkaido regions of Japan in each stage of the production of rice if we encourage the contract farming. At least we are sure that contract farming is one of the promising way to achieve the aim of policy, and we have no reason to stick to the large scale tenant system alone.
Given the acceptance of the GATT Uruguay Round accord, it is hard to imagine a situation where the Japanese government could set the domestic price of rice at an artificially high level at their will. The Japanese government sustained the high price of rice through the acreage control program, but the application of a uniform rate of acreage control independent of farm size is counterproductive given the huge disparity in the average cost of production with respect to farm size. If a reduction in the price of rice is necessary, the acreage control program per se is not compatible with this national objective. If it is still difficult to concentrate farm land towards large scale farms via land lease agreements, the Japanese government should also encourage contract farming in the Non-Hokkaido region, and reduce both the cost of production of relatively small farms and price of rice. Note: Power rice planters include less than 2, 2-4, and more than 6 row types. 
